3GPP TS 33.517
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the SEcurity Anchor Function (SEAF) network product class
V18.3.0 (2024-06) — Release 18 SCAS Product Class Note: In Rel-15/16/17/18, the SEAF is co-located with the AMF. This SCAS defines requirements for the SEAF function itself, whether co-located or separated.
1. Scope
▶Defines security requirements for the SEAF. The SEAF receives K_SEAF from the AUSF and derives K_AMF for the AMF. It anchors the security context in the serving network.
4. SEAF Product Class Definition
▶
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ AUSF │──────►│ SEAF │──────►│ AMF │
└──────────┘ │ (this) │ └──────────┘
K_SEAF │ │ K_AMF
│ Derives │
│ K_AMF │
│ from │
│ K_SEAF │
└──────────┘
The SEAF holds K_SEAF, which is the trust anchor for the serving network. From K_SEAF, it derives K_AMF using the ABBA parameter (Anti-Bidding-down Between Architectures).
5. SEAF-Specific Threats
▶TR 33.926 §5.3.5 Unauthorized access to K_SEAF anchor key ▶
- K_SEAF extraction: Allows attacker to derive all session keys
- ABBA manipulation: Forcing downgrade from 5G to 4G security level
- K_AMF re-derivation bypass: Reusing old K_SEAF after re-authentication
6. Security Requirements and Test Cases
▶ TC_SEAF_KEY_DERIVATION
CRITICAL
Procedure
- Verify K_SEAF is stored in protected memory
- Verify K_AMF derivation uses correct ABBA parameter
- Verify old K_SEAF is deleted after new authentication completes
- Verify K_SEAF is unique per authentication (not reused across sessions)
TC_SEAF_ABBA_VALIDATION
CRITICAL
Procedure
- Verify ABBA parameter is correctly set per current architecture (5G vs EPC interworking)
- Verify ABBA prevents bidding-down between 5G and 4G security
- Send manipulated ABBA → verify derivation fails or is rejected
7. SCAS Test Case Summary
▶| Test Case ID | Category | Priority |
|---|---|---|
| TC_SEAF_KEY_DERIVATION | Key Management | CRITICAL |
| TC_SEAF_ABBA_VALIDATION | Anti-Bidding-Down | CRITICAL |
| Plus ALL test cases from TS 33.117 | ||