3GPP TS 33.517

5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the SEcurity Anchor Function (SEAF) network product class
V18.3.0 (2024-06) — Release 18 SCAS Product Class
Note: In Rel-15/16/17/18, the SEAF is co-located with the AMF. This SCAS defines requirements for the SEAF function itself, whether co-located or separated.

1. Scope

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Defines security requirements for the SEAF. The SEAF receives K_SEAF from the AUSF and derives K_AMF for the AMF. It anchors the security context in the serving network.

4. SEAF Product Class Definition

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┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │ AUSF │──────►│ SEAF │──────►│ AMF │ └──────────┘ │ (this) │ └──────────┘ K_SEAF │ │ K_AMF │ Derives │ │ K_AMF │ │ from │ │ K_SEAF │ └──────────┘

The SEAF holds K_SEAF, which is the trust anchor for the serving network. From K_SEAF, it derives K_AMF using the ABBA parameter (Anti-Bidding-down Between Architectures).

5. SEAF-Specific Threats

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TR 33.926 §5.3.5 Unauthorized access to K_SEAF anchor key ▶

  • K_SEAF extraction: Allows attacker to derive all session keys
  • ABBA manipulation: Forcing downgrade from 5G to 4G security level
  • K_AMF re-derivation bypass: Reusing old K_SEAF after re-authentication

6. Security Requirements and Test Cases

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TC_SEAF_KEY_DERIVATION
CRITICAL
Procedure
  1. Verify K_SEAF is stored in protected memory
  2. Verify K_AMF derivation uses correct ABBA parameter
  3. Verify old K_SEAF is deleted after new authentication completes
  4. Verify K_SEAF is unique per authentication (not reused across sessions)
TC_SEAF_ABBA_VALIDATION
CRITICAL
Procedure
  1. Verify ABBA parameter is correctly set per current architecture (5G vs EPC interworking)
  2. Verify ABBA prevents bidding-down between 5G and 4G security
  3. Send manipulated ABBA → verify derivation fails or is rejected

7. SCAS Test Case Summary

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Test Case IDCategoryPriority
TC_SEAF_KEY_DERIVATIONKey ManagementCRITICAL
TC_SEAF_ABBA_VALIDATIONAnti-Bidding-DownCRITICAL
Plus ALL test cases from TS 33.117